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In early December, the U.S. President brought together the leaders of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to sign a peace agreement. His pledge was an end to long-standing fighting in the turbulent eastern DRC, framing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to unlock economic gains.

Weeks later, however, a sharply contrasting approach to conflict emerged. It was declared that U.S. forces had executed Christmas Day airstrikes in northwestern Nigeria, striking sites connected to the Islamic State (IS). On a online platform, the President stated, “I have previously warned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

An Evident Strategic Pivot

This dichotomy exemplifies the central feature of the U.S. approach to sub-Saharan Africa in this administration: a de-emphasis from promoting democracy and human rights in favor of a avowed focus on economic deals and stopping hostilities—even as this squares with the new air campaign in Nigeria remains to be seen.

“Our view has shifted from Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a slogan often repeated for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” declared a top U.S. state department official in a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A presidential spokesperson echoed this, saying the President “views Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American capital, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations secure peace, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Strategic Results and Mixed Signals

This change is consequential, but analysts note it is premature to judge its results. The approach is complicated by the President’s unconventional diplomacy, which has included conflicts with long-standing U.S. partners and insults directed at Africans.

“The core tenet is, if it’s in the long-term or short-term interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” commented a senior fellow for Africa studies at a prominent foreign policy council.

Notable policy moves have included:

• Shutting down the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. A study predicts this could lead to millions of additional deaths globally by 2030, with a large number in Africa.
• Imposing visa restrictions on citizens from more than two dozen African countries and stopping most refugee admissions.
• Implementing a global tariff campaign that has harmed African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Letting a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to expire without renewal.

Diplomatic Neglect and Friction

In contrast to his recent predecessors, the President did not travel to sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His most notable engagement with African affairs was referring to nations on the continent with a crude epithet, which he later acknowledged using.

“Africa sits at dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for the President, but for the administration in general,” stated the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which devoted only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A significant dispute has broken out with South Africa, reportedly shaped by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The idea of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa fits perfectly now in U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” commented a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Business-Like Relations and Targeted Involvement

A similar confrontation emerged with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This collided with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation split between Christians and Muslims and suffering from security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts noted that the forceful rhetoric may have prompted the government into greater action on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had authorized the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has made no secret his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has brokered in the Congo conflict and dispatched a diplomat to try to negotiate a resolution in Sudan’s civil war, as yet without success. While the Congo deal was reportedly broken quickly, it “at least serves to introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” argued one conflict expert.

An Echo of Competitors

Some analysts describe the new U.S. approach as paralleling that of other major powers like Russia and China, who have increased their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on strategic interests.

“It’s a long overdue recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” observed one foreign policy analyst.

In practice, the revised strategy likely means that “an African country that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The diplomacy that we are talking about does not seek to spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a quid-pro-quo posture towards Africa,” the journalist concluded.